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Delays, Suspensions
and Available Remedies
Under Government Contracts
In this article, Mr. Gaskins undertakes a detailed analysis of
numerous decisions of the Court of Claims and the United
States Supreme Court relating to delays in the performance
of government contracts. He focuses primarily on those
delays attributable to the government, for which the con-
tractor may seek damages, and concludes that existing law
often does not afford the contractor adequate relief. He
suggests that adoption of a uniform suspension of work
clause would eliminate many of the legal pitfalls that cur-
rently exist in the increasingly important field of govern-
ment procurement.
John W. Gaskins *
Delays in the performance of government contracts probably
have accounted for more losses and a greater percentage of busi-
ness failures among government contractors than any other single
complication that can arise in this highly specialized field of ac-
tivity. A government contractor must be content with a relatively
narrow margin of profit in order to remain competitive, must haz-
ard large amounts of capital to be in a position to perform on time,
and must agree to pay substantial sums of liquidated damages if he
delays completion; but with it all, he finds that in most instances
the success of his undertaking depends as much upon the degree of
cooperation and assistance which he receives from the government
as it does upon his own activity. This is so for a variety of reasons.
Few government contracts which involve substantial sums of money
are ever completed in strict accordance with their original techni-
cal requirements and drawings. Instead, changes and revisions in
the work are usually ordered by the government during perform-
ance of the contract. Preservation or destruction of a proper work-
ing sequence may depend upon the manner in which changes are
ordered; inconsiderate action by the government in this regard
Member of District of Columbia Bar.
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may make an otherwise satisfactory contractual arrangement un-
profitable, or even disastrous, for the contractor. Furthermore, gov-
ernmental delays in procuring the site and in supplying mate-
rials which it contracted to provide, and delays caused by the ac-
tivities, or inactivities, of third parties who entered into direct con-
tracts with the government which can affect the contractor's per-
formance, may intervene to his detriment. The prevention of these,
and delays of a similar nature, requires a high degree of coordina-
tion between the activities of the government and the contractor,
and genuine cooperation between the two if the contract is to be a
success.
To simplify this discussion, delays under government contracts
will be placed in two general categories. First, there are those for
which the contractor may be said to be responsible, and which en-
title the government either to terminate the contract for default, or
to permit the contract to continue subject to the deduction from
monies earned of a stipulated amount per day for liquidated dam-
ages. Second, there are delays which may result from acts by the
government which hinder the contractor in the fulfilment of his
contract obligation and result in additional costs for which he may
make claim against the government. These two types of delays will
be considered separately in this Article.
I. DELAYS CAUSED BY CONTRACTOR WHICH MAY RESULT IN
TEmIvNATION OR LIQUIDATED DA iiAGEs
While government contracts do not recite that time is of the
essence, such an understanding is implicit in their terms. Almost all
contain a time limitation for performance, and provide for the pay-
ment of liquidated damages for each day of delay beyond the stip-
ulated contract time, as extended by the government for cause.
The "damages-delay" clauses of such contracts provide that where
"the contractor refuses or fails to prosecute the work . . . with
such diligence as will insure its completion within the time speci-
fied . . . , the government may .. .terminate [the contractor's]
right to proceed ... [and] may take over the work and prosecute
the same to completion."' In such circumstances, the agreed-upon
liquidated damages are to be paid, and if liquidated damages are
not fixed in the contract, actual damages occasioned by the delay
are recoverable.' In some instances, the right is reserved in the con-
1. Construction Contract, Standard Form 23A, cL 5(a).
2. Ibid. The full text of clause 5 is as follows:
5. Termination for Default-Damages for Delay- Time Extensions.
(a) If the Contractor refuses or fails to prosecute the work, or any separa-
ble part thereof, with such diligence as will insure its completion within the
[Vol. 44:75
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tract to recover both. Where the government elects to terminate
the contract, as distinguished from terminating the contractor's
right to proceed, it forfeits whatever privilege it may have possessed
to assess liquidated damages.3
The standard form contract provides that the contractor's right to
proceed shall not be terminated, nor liquidated or actual damages
charged, for delays due to unforeseeable causes without the fault
time specified in this contract, or any extension thereof, or fails to complete
said work within such time, the Government may, by written notice to the Con-
tractor, terminate his right to proceed with the work or such part of the work
as to which there has been delay. In such event the Government may take over
the work and prosecute the same to completion, by contract or otherwise, and
the Contractor and his sureties shall be liable to the Government for any excess
cost occasioned the Government thereby, and for liquidated damages for delay,
as fixed in the specifications or accompanying papers, until such reasonable
time as may be required for the final completion of the work, or if liquidated
damages are not so fixed, any actual damages occasioned by such delay. If
the Contractor's right to proceed is so terminated, the Government may take
possession of and utilize in completing the work such materials, appliances,
and plant as may be on the site of the work and necessary therefor.
(b) If the Government does not terminate the right of the Contractor to
proceed, as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, the Contractor shall continue the
work, in which event he and his sureties shall be liable to the Government,
in the amount set forth in the specifications or accompanying papers, for fixed,
agreed, and liquidated damages for each calendar day of delay until the work
is completed or accepted, or if liquidated damages are not so fixed, any actual
damages occasioned by such delay.
(c) The right of the Contractor to proceed shall not be terminated, as
provided in paragraph (a) hereof, nor the Contractor charged with liquidated
or actual damages, as provided in paragraph (b) hereof because of any delays
in the completion of the work due to unforeseeable causes beyond the control
and without the fault or negligence of the Contractor, including, but not re-
stricted to, acts of God, or of the public enemy, acts of the Government, in
either its sovereign or contractual capacity,.acts of another contractor in the
performance of a contract with the Government, fires, floods, epidemics, quar-
antine restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes, and unusually severe weather, or
delays of subcontractors or suppliers due to such causes:* Provided, That the
Contractor shall within 10 days from the beginning of any such delay, unless
the Contracting Officer shall grant a further period of time prior to the date of
final settlement of the contract, notify the Contracting Officer in writing of the
causes of delay. The Contracting Officer shall ascertain the facts and the extent
of the delay and extend the time for completing the work when in his judg-
ment the findings of fact justify such an extension, and his findings of fact
thereon shall be final and conclusive on the parties hereto, subject only to ap-
peal as provided in Clause 6 hereof.
3. United States v. American Sur. Co., 322 U.S. 96, 100 (1944); Manart Tex-
tile Co. v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 540, 548, 77 F. Supp. 924, 925 (1948); Na-
tional Sur. Corp. v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl. 671, 679-80 (1944); Maryland
Cas. Co. v. United States, 93 Ct. CL 247, 254 (1941); Firemen's Fund Indem. Co.
v. United States, 93 Ct. Cl. 138, 143 (1941); American Employers Ins. Co. v. United
States, 91 Ct. CL 231, 239-40 (1940); Sternberg Dredging Co. v. United States,
87 Ct. CL 332, 346 (1938); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. United States, 83 Ct. CL
367, 375 (1936); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. United States, 81 Ct. CL 495, 502 (1935);
see Schmoll v. United States, 105 Ct. CL 415, 452, 63 F. Supp. 753, 756, cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 724 (1946).
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or negligence of the contractor. A number of specific examples of
delay falling within this category are described in the contract.
Such delays include those caused by acts of God, the public enemy,
the government, or another contractor in the performance of a con-
tract with the government; unusual occurrences; 4 and "delays of
subcontractors or suppliers due to such causes." 5
While the general rule applicable to liquidated damages for
delay under government contracts is that the parties may agree to
include a provision for the same in lieu of actual damages, but not
by way of penalty,' these provisions are not favored if actual dam-
ages are not known to have been sustained, and will be enforced
only if the government has complied with all the requirements of
the contract which were prerequisite to enforcement.' If it appears
that both parties to the contract may have contributed to the delay,
the Court of Claims is ostensibly reluctant to apportion the delay
between the parties, and it has tended to find that the provision
for liquidated damages has been waived." However, in one case
where material delays have already been apportioned by the con-
tracting officer, and liquidated damages assessed on the basis of
such apportionment, the Court of Claims upheld the finality of
such apportionment." It is clear that where the cause of delay is
principally ascribable to some act or failure to act by the govern-
ment, the court will not assess liquidated damages, and will hold
that the time limit of the contract has been waived.10
4. "Unusual occurrences" includes fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions,
strikes, freight embargoes, and unusually severe weather. Construction Contract,
Standard Form 23A, cl. 5(c).
5. Ibid.
6. MacDonald v. United States, 74 Ct. Cl. 572, 580-81 (1932).
7. Schmoll v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 1, 28 (1940); Wharton Green & Co. v.
United States, 86 Ct. Cl. 100, 108 (1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 661 (1938);
Christensen Constr. Co. v. United States, 72 Ct. Cl. 500, 517 (1931).
8. Austin Eng'r Co. v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 68, 79 (1942); McGlone v.
United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 507, 540 (1942); H. W. Zweig Co. v. United States, 92
Ct. Cl. 472, 481 (1941); Schmoll v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 1, 28 (1940); Whar-
ton Green & Co. v. United States, 86 Ct. Cl. 100, 108 (1937), cert. denied, 303
U.S. 661 (1938); Monks v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 302, 338 (1934); Sun Ship-
building Co. v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 154, 188 (1932); Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 845, 866-67 (1932); Carroll v. United States, 68 Ct. CL
500, 508 (1929); Standard Steel Car Co. v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 445, 475-76
(1929); Camden Iron Works v. United States, 51 Ct. Cl. 9, 17-18 (1915).
9. Franco-American Constr. Co. v. United States, 76 Ct. CL 132, 149 (1932).
10. United States v. United Eng'r & Contracting Co., 234 U.S. 236, 242 (1914);
Langevin v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 15, 39 (1943); Austin Eng'r Co. v. United
States, 97 Ct. Cl. 68, 79 (1942); Hirsch v. United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 602, 634 (1941);
Schmoll v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 1, 28 (1940); Graybar Elec. Co. v. United
States, 90 Ct. Cl. 232, 246 (1940); MacDonald Eng'r Co. v. United States, 88 Ct.
Cl. 473, 483-84 (1939); Wharton Green & Co. v. United States, 86 Ct. Cl. 100,
107 (1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 661 (1938); Camp Sales Corp. v. United States,
[Vol. 44:75
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If an excusable delay is encountered by a contractor, he must
give written notice of the delay to the government within ten days
after the beginning of the delay, in this manner setting in motion
the administrative processes which may lead to a time extension
for the purpose of preventing assessment of liquidated damages."
The contracting officer is then required to ascertain the facts and
the extent of the delay, and to extend the contract time when in his
judgment the facts justify such an extension. 2 His findings are sub-
ject to review by the head of the department, if a written appeal
is made within thirty days after their issuance. If the contractor
does not appeal, the contracting officer's findings on the cause and
extent of the delay are final. If an appeal is taken which results in
affirmation of the findings of the contracting officer, the administra-
tive determination thus arrived at on appeal is final, and any delay
attributable to the contractor as a result of such findings will be
reckoned in liquidated damages and deducted from monies other-
wise earned by him.' 3 The finality which, by the terms of the
contract, attaches to an appellate decision of the head of the de-
partment regarding the extent of a delay is subject to the right of
the Court of Claims to set it aside if it was arrived at fraudulently,
capriciously, or arbitrarily; was so grossly erroneous as necessarily
to imply bad faith; or was not supported by substantial evidence. 4
While some decisions have questioned the legal necessity of giv-
ing the government notice of delay where it was responsible for the
delay and presumably possessed knowledge of it,'5 there is also au-
thority for the proposition that the failure to give such notice pre-
77 Ct. Cl. 659, 664-65 (1933); Christensen Constr. Co. v. United States, 72 Ct. Cl.
500, 517 (1931); Newcomb v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 246, 250 (1929); Greeley
Iron Works v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 828, 333 (1928); Ittner v. United States,
43 Ct. CL 836, 351 (1908).
11. See note 2 supra.
12. Ibid.
13. Clause 5(c) of the Construction Contract, Standard Form, supra note 2,
when read with appeal clause 6, as follows:
6. Disputes.
[Any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this contract
which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the Contracting
Officer. . . . Within 30 days from the date of receipt of such [decision] the
Contractor may appeal . . . to the head of the department, and the decision of
the head of the department or his duly authorized representatives for the
hearing of such appeals shall, unless determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, or so grossly errone-
ous as necessarily to imply bad faith, [or not supported by substantial evidence],
be final and conclusive: Provided, that, if no such appeal to the head of the
department is taken, the decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and
conclusive. ...
14. 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (Supp. V, 1958).
15. Hirsch v. United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 602, 632 (1941); Carroll v. United States,
76 Ct. CL 103, 130 (1932) (concurring opinion); 8 DEcs. Comp. Gm. 536 (1929).
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eludes the contractor from recovering liquidated damages assessed
against him by the government. 6 In such circumstances, prudent
advice would call for giving written notice within ten days after the
commencement of the delay. It is worth noting in this connection
that the contractor's oversight in giving a written notice may be ex-
cused, and the contract requirement for such notice waived, if the
contracting officer or head of the department undertakes considera-
tion of a request for a time extension on its merits, and raises no
objection to the absence of the written notice.
II. DELAYS CAusED BY THE Gov 'Rm FOR WHICH DAMAGES
MAY BE Soucrrr BY Tm CoNTRACTOR
The right of a government contractor to recover increased costs
or damages resulting from a delay caused by the government arises
out of a breach by the government of its implied obligation to do
nothing which hinders, burdens or delays performance of the con-
tract, or makes such performance more expensive.," This implied
obligation goes beyond abstention by the government from an act
of interference. It requires government personnel to actively coop-
erate so as to permit the contractor to fulfill his obligations in a
timely manner. 9
16. Newcomb v. United States, 68 Ct. CL 371, 377-78 (1929).
17. Carroll v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 103, 131-32 (1932) (concurring opinion);
Pope v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 436, 447 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 610 (1933).
18. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. United States, 138 Ct. CI 668, 674-75, 151 F.
Supp. 726, 731 (1957); Thompson v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 1, 7, 124 F. Supp.
645, 649 (1954); Hughes Transp., Inc. v. United States, 128 Ct. C1. 221, 261, 121
F. Supp. 212, 237 (1954) (concurring opinion); Chalender v. United States, 127
Ct. CL 557, 563, 119 F. Supp. 186, 190 (1954); Sunswick Corp. v. United States,
109 Ct. Cl. 772, 789-90, 75 F. Supp. 221, 224, cert. denied, 334 U.S. 827 (1948);
George A. Fuller Co. v. United States, 108 Ct. CL 70, 94, 69 F. Supp. 409, 411-12
(1947); Harwood-Nebel Constr. Co. v. United States, 105 Ct. CL 116, 156-60
(1945); York Eng'r Co. v. United States, 103 Ct. Cl. 613, 656, 62 F. Supp. 546, 567
(1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 784 (1946); Beuttas v. United States, 101 Ct CL
748, 766, 60 F. Supp. 771, 779 (1944), reefd, 324 U.S. 768, 772-73 (1945); Blair
v. United States, 99 Ct. C1. 71, 139 (1942), modified for other reasons, 321 U.S. 730
(1944); Carroll v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 103, 118-19 (1932); 5 WHnuroN, CoN-
TRAcrs, § 1293A, 1318 (rev. ed. 1937); cf. Schmoll v. United States, 91 Ct CL 1,
27-28 (1940); but see Clemmer Constr. Co. v. United States, 108 Ct. Cl. 718, 721,
71 F. Supp. 917, 919 (1947).
19. In Monks v. United States, a case involving building construction under a
contract with the Navy, the court expounded this principle as follows:
The contract work that plaintiff was engaged in necessitated some degree of
cooperation upon the part of the public works officer. This meant not merely
the performance by the public works officer of those obligations specifically
enumerated in the contract, together with abstention from all interference with
plaintiff's work, but required enough activity on his part to at least make possi-
ble the advancement of the work at the agreed rate.
79 Ct. Cl. 302, 338 (1934). Many years later the doctrine was reaffirmed in Khem
Corp. v. United States, where the government had delayed supplying a portion of
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Government contracts seldom contain a fixed time within which
the government must acomplish an antecedent act essential to the
contractor's performance. The rule which has been applied in these
circumstances is that performance by the government must take
place within a reasonable time, or sufficiently far in advance to en-
able the contractor to complete his contract in accordance with
its terms.20 This principle probably has found its widest application
in those situations where progress under the contract had been
dependent upon the making of prompt decisions by the govern.-
ment with respect to the technical requirements of performance.2'
More specifically, delays compensable in damages usually in-
volve the belated supplying by the government of necessary plans
and drawings, models, and other construction details.22 While some
projects have involved an astonishingly large number of drawings
which must be prepared by the government and supplied to the
contractor after commencement of the work, the court has refused
to accept the magnitude of the task of preparing such drawings as
any excuse for failure to make them available promptly to the con-
tractor.23 Other examples of compensable acts by the government
an assembly which was to be installed in bombs. The court said:
The law considers a promise such as plaintiffs to be subject to a "constructive
condition of cooperation." ... The promisor s undertaking normally gives rise
to an implied complementary obligation on the part of the promisee: he must
not only not hinder his promisor's performance, he must do whatever is neces-
sary to enable him to perform.... The implied obligation is as binding as if
it were spelled out.
119 Ct. CL 454, 469, 93 F. Supp. 620, 623 (1950).
20. Rogers v. United States, 99 Ct. CL 393, 409 (1943); Hirsch v. United States,
94 Ct. CL 602, 626-31 (1941); Cain Co. v. United States, 79 Ct. C1. 290, 297-98
(1934); Carroll v. United States, 68 Ct. CL 500, 505--07 (1929); Worthington Pump
& Mach. Corp. v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 230, 240 (1928); M.H. McCloskey, Jr.
v. United States, 66 Ct. CL 105, 128 (1928); Snare & Triest Co. v. United States,
43 Ct. CL. 364, 367 (1908); Harvey v. United States, 8 Ct. CL 501, 508 (1872); cf.
Carroll v. United States, 76 Ct. CL 103, 116-19, 122 (1932); Gustavino Co. v.
United States, 50 Ct. CL 115, 119 (1915).
21. Hirsch v. United States, 94 Ct. CL 602, 627 (1941); Baruch Corp. v. United
States, 92 Ct. CL 571, 587-88 (1941); Callahan Constr. Co. v. United States, 91
Ct. CL 538, 626-31 (1940); Plato v. United States, 86 Ct. CL 665, 666 (1938);
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. United States, 71 Ct. CL. 739, 758 (1931); see Ameri-
can Bridge Co. v. United States, 72 Ct. CL 344, 367 (1931).
22. F. H. McGraw & Co. v. United States, 113 Ct. CL 29, 48-51, 82 F. Supp.
338, 339-40 (1949); George A. Fuller Co. v. United States, 108 Ct. Cl. 70, 93-102,
69 F. Supp. 409, 410-15 (1947); Henry Ericsson Co. v. United States, 104 Ct. CL.
397, 425-26, 62 F. Supp. 312, 325 (1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 784 (1946);
Baruch Corp. v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. 571, 588 (1941); Largura Constr. Co. v.
United States, 88 Ct. CL. 531, 546-47 (1939); Plato v. United States, 86 Ct. CL.
665, 666-70 (1938); Karno-Smith Co. v. United States, 84 Ct. CL 110, 122-23
(1936); American Bridge Co. v. United States, 72 Ct. CL 344, 346 (1931).
23. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. United States, 138 Ct. CL 668, 678, 151 F. Supp.
726, 733 (1957).
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are delays in furnishing and preparing the site,24 in staking out and
locating the work,25 in making available an inspector,26 and in sup-
plying corrections for a faulty design, 7 as well as delay attendant
upon a faulty or defective foundation itself,2" and delay due to mis-
representation of subsurface conditions.29 Similarly, delays which
have resulted from too active participation or intervention by the
government in the operations of the contractor have been recog-
nized as compensable, as well as the interference caused by an
arbitrary or deliberately obstructive attitude on the part of govern-
ment officials toward the work.3
The greatest number of controversies arise out of delays resulting
from changes ordered by the government, or from belated delivery
by the government of materials which the contractor was required
to use in performance of the work and which the government had
agreed to supply. A lesser number of controversies also arise out of
failure of the government to make available in a timely manner
the site upon which construction work is to be performed. Since dif-
fering rules apply to delays from these three causes, they will be
separately considered.
A. Delays Arising From Changes
It is possible that the ordering of changes in the work may delay
completion of the work for either of two reasons. First, the interval
of time elapsing between the date when a contractor is advised by
the government that a change will be forthcoming and the time
when the government supplies him with the required technical de-
tails may be unreasonably long. If the contractor were obliged to
hold up his operations until he received the required details, this
loss of time could be reflected in the final completion of the entire
24. Hirsch v. United States, 94 Ct. CI. 602, 629 (1941); Edward E. Gillen Co.
v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 847, 368 (1939); Phoenix Bridge Co. v. United States,
85 Ct. CI. 603, 610 (1937); Carroll v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 103, 118 (1932);
American Bridge Co. v. United States, 72 Ct. Cl. 344, 358-60 (1931).
25. Hirsch v. United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 602, 629 (1941); M. Cain Co. v. United
States, 79 Ct. Cl. 290, 298 (1934); Carroll v. United States, 76 Ct. CL 103, 117
(1932); Pope v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 436, 450 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S.
610 (1933).
26. Hirsch v. United States, 94 Ct. CL. 602, 630 (1941).
27. Warren Bros. Roads Co. v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 48, 82, 105 F. Supp. 826,
830 (1952).
28. Baruch Corp. v. United States, 93 Ct. Cl. 107, 122 (1941); Sobel v. United
States, 88 Ct. Cl. 149, 165 (1938); Rust Eng'r Co. v. United States, 86 Ct. CL 461,
475 (1938).
29. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 566, 573-74 (1932).
30. Blair v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 71, 139-40 (1942), modified, 321 U.S. 730
(1944); Phoenix Bridge Co. v. United States, 85 Ct. CI. 603, 618-19, (1937); Pope
v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 64, 86-87, 99-100 (1932), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 654
(1938); cf. Austin Eng'r Co. v. United States, 97 Ct. CL. 68, 77 (1942).
[Vol. 44:75
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project and could result in the encountering of costs that would not
have been incurred if the change had been ordered with prompt-
ness and dispatch. Second, a change may increase the volume of
work to be performed, and cause the time of completion to be un-
duly prolonged, or it may disorganize a predetermined sequence of
operations and involve revision of work already accomplished. In
either event, the change may bring about a greater expense to the
contractor than the amount allowable under the change order,
which usually covers only the cost of labor and materials, equip-
ment allowance, percentage for overhead, and percentage for profit
for the physical change itself. In the first situation involving de-
layed issuance of a change order, the right to recover the additional
cost is clear, while in the second, the increased cost of the delay
might not be recoverable.
No consideration of this subject would be complete without men-
tioning the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Rice."'
While this decision dealt primarily with the implied obligation of
the government to make a site available to a contractor, its impact
on the subject of delay resulting from changes is unmistakable and
clear. Prior to 1942, when the Rice case was decided, it had been
generally recognized that since the government had bargained in
the contract for the right to make changes, its exercise of that right
would not subject it to liability for consequential damages resulting
from the added time necessary to perform the changed work.3 2
However, the government could be held liable for an abuse of its
right to make changes, such as for an unreasonable delay in pro-
viding the contractor with the details of a change, its delay inter-
fering with performance of the contractor's work.33
United States v. Rice arose out of a contract with the United
States to install certain equipment in buildings which were being
erected by the government through another contractor. The build-
ing contractor encountered subsurface conditions more difficult than
either he or the government had anticipated, which necessitated
changing the site of the work and the nature of the foundation to
be installed. The plaintiff was accordingly delayed in the installa-
tion of its equipment, and sought to recover the increased cost re-
sulting from the delay. The Supreme Court held that the govern-
ment had reserved the right to make changes which might inter-
rupt the work, and asserted that therefore the parties never con-
templated that delay incident to changes would subject the govern-
31. 317 U.S. 61 (1942).
32. B-W Construction Co. v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 92, 114 (1942); Snare
& Triest Co. v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 326, 349-50 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S.
742 (1933).
33. P. J. Carlin & Co. v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 376, 392-93 (1918).
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ment to damages. Instead, it held that the contractor was entitled
only to a "'compensating extension of time." ' This decision, which
gave no recognition of any obligation of the government to refrain
from delaying a contractor unreasonably, and which limited the
relief obtainable to an extension of time for performance, con-
travened a long line of precedents which had held that granting
an extension of time to a contractor would not relieve the govern-
ment of liability for damages resulting from its delays.35
It was evident to the Court of Claims that if government contracts
were interpreted in such a manner that delays on the part of the
government could be compensated for by a time extension only,
contractors would include in their bids an amount to compensate
them for the possible losses they might sustain due to government
changes, losses for which they could not recover under the rule of
the Rice case. Consequently, in Rogers v. United States, 6 decided
soon after the Rice case, the Court of Claims construed the implica-
tions of the Rice case narrowly. The Rogers case involved work
which was dependent upon the government's removal of railroad
tracks situated on the work site. This work was to be done by a
third-party contractor, whose performance was delayed by exten-
sive changes which the government made in his work. As a defense,
the government relied on the Rice case, but the court rejected this
defense, saying:
We do not construe the Rice case as holding that affirmative wrongful
action or failure of the defendant to discharge its obligations under the
contract could be cured by simply waiving liquidated damages. The liqui-
dated damages clause is placed in the contract for the protection of the
defendant. If it were held that the simple waiver of such a penalty clause
were all the relief that could be secured by plaintiffs, regardless of the
added expense of labor, bonds, interest, rental of machinery and other
costs, and regardless of how long a delay might be occasioned by the de-
fendant, then the plaintiffs would have no protection from wrongful
acts or from negligent failure of the defendant to perform its obligations
under the contract. We do not think the officials of the defendant should
be permitted to "kick the contractor all over the lot" and escape re-
sponsibility by merely waiving the right to collect liquidated damages,
regardless of what the additional costs to him might be. If such a con-
struction were made, it would certainly cost the defendant heavily in the
form of higher bids in all future contracts. Neither the language of the
34. 317 U.S. at 66.
35. George A. Fuller Co. v. United States, 108 Ct. Cl. 70, 97, 69 F. Supp. 409,
413 (1947); Sobel v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 149, 165 (1938); Plato v. United
States, 86 Ct. Cl. 665, 678 (1938); Karno-Smith Co. v. United States, 84 Ct. CL
110, 122 (1936); Newport News Shipbuilding Co. v. United States, 79 Ct. CL 1,
24 (1934); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. CL 566, 577 (1932);
Steel Products Eng'r Co. v. United States, 71 Ct. CL 457, 470 (1931).
36. 99 Ct. CL 393 (1943).
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opinion nor the issue involved in the Rice case justifies any such construc-
tion.3 7
Following the Rogers case, the Court of Claims continued to hold
that while the government was not liable for the additional time
required to perform the work as changed, it would be held liable
for unreasonable delay in ordering the desired change.3s
Ten years later the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Conti-
nental Illinois Natl Bank v. United States, 9 a case in which the
merit of the rule established by the Court of Claims was challenged
on appeal. The Continental Illinois case involved a situation in
which the government had consumed 175 days in issuing a change
for the design of a boiler house. The Court of Claims had allowed
recovery for breach of contract, holding:
The right reserved in the contract to make changes in the work does
not mean that the Government can take as much time as it pleases to
consider such changes, regardless of consequences to the other party to
the contract.4 0
Thus, the rule still stands that a contractor may recover damages
for delay caused by the government's unreasonable delay in order-
ing changes, but not for delay resulting from having to make the
changes.
At this point a practical consideration is in order. When a con-
tractor has undergone an expensive delay preceding the issuance of
definite instructions from the government about how he should
proceed with a change (for which he desires reimbursement), and
after performance of the changed work he is tendered a written
change order providing reimbursement for labor and material and
37. Id. at 411.
38. F. H. McGraw & Co. v. United States, 181 Ct CL. 501, 506-07, 130 F. Supp.
894, 897-98 (1955); James Stewart & Co. v. United States, 105 Ct. Cl. 284, 828-30,
63 F. Supp. 653, 656 (1946); Harwood-Nebel Constr. Co. v. United States, 105 Ct.
CL 116, 158 (1945); Silberblatt & Lasker v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 54, 82
(1944); Langevin v. United States, 100 Ct. CL 15, 31 (1943). The principle, as it
is presently enforced, is well expressed in J. A. Ross & Co. v. United States, 126 Ct.
CL 823, 831-32, 115 F. Supp. 187, 191 (1958), where the Court of Claims said:
The possibility of changes and delays necessarily incident thereto was in the
contemplation of the parties, or should have been. Defendant reserved, by arti-
cles 3 and 4 of the contract, the right to make changes, and by article 5 of the
contract the right to order extra work. For any necessary delays resulting from
the exercise by the Government of some reserved right there is no liability.
Stafford v. United States, 109 Ct. CL 479, 74 F. Supp. 155; Parish v. United
States, 120 Ct. CL 100, 98 F. Supp. 347, and numerous other cases.
There is, however, an implied obligation on the part of the United States
not to cause unreasonable delay in making permitted changes in the contract,
for the breach of which plaintiff is entitled to recover whatever damages it has
suffered thereby.
39. 121 Ct. CL 208, 101 F. Supp. 755, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 963 (1952).
40. Id. at 243, 101 F. Supp. at 757.
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minor allowances for overhead and profit, he should neither sign
the change order nor accept the money tendered without an under-
standing from the contracting officer that by so doing he will not
prejudice his right to seek reimbursement for the delay. The Court
of Claims has construed the effect of a contractor's accepting a
change order in two ways, depending on the facts of each case.
Generally, acceptance of the change order will operate to waive the
claim for damages for delay.41 However, where the facts indicate
that the amount paid by the government under the change order
obviously was intended to cover only the cost of the extra work
itself, and included nothing for the delay preceding the issuance
of the change order, the court will not bar a claim for delay.4
In the present state of the law, prudent advice would clearly call
for an express reservation of rights before acceptance of the change
order.
B. Delay Arising From Belated Furnishing of Materials by the
Government
The law relating to delay by the government in supplying ma-
terials needed for performance of the contract has undergone a
curious development in recent years, with far less satisfactory re-
sults from a contractor's point of view than those obtained in con-
nection with the delayed issuance of changes. This development
must be attributed to the 1946 decision of the Supreme Court in
United States v. Howard P. Foley Co.43
Prior to the Foley decision, the obligation of the government to
supply materials which it had contracted to furnish was no differ-
41. Coath & Goss, Inc. v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 653, 661 (1944); Seeds v.
United States, 92 Ct. CL. 97, 108-12 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 697 (1941);
Schmoll v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 1, 29-30 (1940); Snare & Triest Co. v. United
States, 75 Ct. Cl. 326, 352-53 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 742 (1933).
In the Snare & Triest case, the court uses confusing terminology. For example, on
page 353 it says:
There was not any "waiver" of the rights of the plaintiff in the supplemental
agreement, or in the mere fact that a supplemental agreement was entered
into, as contended by the defendant, but there was a merger of all the rights of
the plaintiff under the contract as originally drawn up, into the contract as it
stood after the amendment was agreed to. Certainly when so construed there
can be no recovery for delay incident to the changes in plans. The plans, as
changed, were the subject matter of the contract as amended, and the work
specified in the plans as changed has been fully gaid for at the contract price.
Therefore, even though the court finds no waiver,' it reaches the same result by
use of the word "merger."
42. Herbert M. Baruch Corp. v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. 571, 587-588 (1941);
Stapleton Constr. Co. v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. 551, 569 (1940); Rust Eng'r Co. v.
United States, 86 Ct. Cl. 461, 475 (1938); American Bridge Co. v. United States, 72
Ct. Cl. 344, 367 (1931).
43. 329 U.S. 64 (1946).
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ent from that imposed upon it to perform any other act which it
had agreed to perform as part of its contract responsibilities.44 As
presently enforced, however, the government's liability for failure
to supply materials appears to depend upon whether it has been
guilty of tort-like conduct, that is, whether it has been negligent
in its efforts to carry out its contract commitment and has failed
to exercise due diligence in that regard.
The Foley case did not involve a failure to supply materials, but
instead it related to the government's obligation to supply a site.
The respondent, an electrical contractor, had been delayed in the
installation of his equipment at an airport because the builder
of the airport had encountered changed subsurface conditions
which necessitated a design change under the contract. The Su-
preme Court emphasized that there was no express covenant that
the runways would be available at any particular time, and that the
contract contemplated the possibility that delay might result from
making changes. In the course of its opinion, the Court observed:
It is suggested that the obligation of respondent to complete the job in
120 days can be inverted into a promise by the Government not to cause
performance to be delayed beyond that time by its negligence. But even if
this provision standing alone could be stretched to mean that the Govern-
ment obligated itself to exercise the highest degree of diligence and the
utmost good faith in efforts to make the runways promptly available, the
facts of this case would show no breach of such an undertaing.45
It is difficult to conclude that by the above statement the Court
intended that liability of the government for the nonfulfillment of
a contract commitment to supply materials would thereafter be
measured by the degree of diligence with which the government
carried out the commitment, but such is the law today in the ab-
sence of a contract warranty that the material will be made avail-
able by a prescribed date.
Daum v. United States,46 decided in 1951, appears to be the first
case in which the Court of Claims combined a situation where delay
was to be anticipated with the proposition advanced in the Foley
case concerning diligence. In the Daum case, the government de-
layed in furnishing certain steel required for the construction of
hangars. This delay was due to the operation of a system of prior-
ities that controlled the production and delivery of steel. The Court
of Claims exonerated the government from liability, because it be-
lieved that the parties were mutually aware of the uncertainty of
obtaining the steel, and because the government had done its best
to obtain the same. In the words of the court:
44. E.g., Donnell-Zane Co. v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 368, 374-75 (1932).
45. 329 U.S. at 66-67.
46. 120 Ct. C1. 192 (1951).
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The parties were well aware that there might be delays, as evidenced
by the fact that the customary liquidated damages clause was stricken
from this contract. Nor does the evidence show that the Government
did not exert its best efforts to obtain the steel it was to furnish. Its failure
to do so was not due to a lack of diligence on its part. Under this state of
facts, we must hold that the decision of the Supreme Couit in United
States v. Howard P. Foley, Inc., 329 U.S. 64, is controlling, and that
plaintiff's petition must be dismissed.4 7
The next pertinent decision rendered by the Court of Claims was
in Otis Williams & Co. v. United States, a case involving facts simi-
lar to those of the Daum case. Citing the Foley case, the court con-
cluded that the government was relieved from liability, because
it had been more than ordinarily diligent in undertaking to obtain
steel.48 In the next relevant case, Barling v. United States,49 although
the court mentioned that steel was difficult to obtain at that time,
its decision did not turn upon the assumption that both parties had
anticipated delay from this condition (which was the principal
thrust of the Foley decision); instead, the court set down the doc-
trine that since the government had not known that it would be
unable to furnish the materials, and had promptly placed an order
for them with a supplier, it had not breached its contractual obliga-
tion to supply such materials. The court said:
There is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant knew or
should have known that it would be unable to furnish reinforcing steel to
the contractor in time for the work to proceed in an orderly manner and
to be completed within the contract period. Nor can we, in the circum-
stances of this case, attach significance to the fact that notice to proceed
was given at a time when the Government did not have on hand or on
order the materials it had agreed to furnish.
Finally, there is no evidence that the defendant was in any way at fault
in failing to exert its best efforts to obtain the steel it had agreed to fur-
nish. On the contrary, we have found that it exercised great diligence in
an effort to secure steel for the plaintiff as needed, and that its inability
to do so was not attributable to any fault or negligence on its part. It was
very difficult to obtain steel in 1946, and the record shows that defendant
did all that it could to prevent costly delays to plaintiff in this regard.
With regard to the delay occasioned by a lack of cement, our findings
show even more clearly that no blame can attach to defendant. Orders
were relayed to the cement manufacturer sufficiently far in advance to
have permitted timely delivery, and defendant cannot be held liable
here because the manufacturer failed to make prompt delivery.
It is clear, under these facts and circumstances, that defendant has in
no wise breached its contractual obligations. 50
47. Id. at 221.
48. 120 Ct. Cl. 249, 273-74 (1951).
49. 126 Ct. CI. 34, 111 F. Supp. 878 (1958).
50. Id. at 88-39, 111 F. Supp. at 880, citing the Foley, Daum and Williams cases.
However, in the later case of Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. United States, 138 Ct. Cl.
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The practical difficulty in contract procedure of substituting a
diligent attempt to perform for actual performance itself is of course
manifest, and why the degree of assiduousness with which the
attempt to perform an unqualified commitment, however difficult
of accomplishment, should be a factor in gauging performance is
not clear. Clauses in government contracts which call for materials
to be supplied by the government are also drafted solely by the
government, and the terms of these provisions are not the result
of negotiation between the parties. By their inclusion, it is generally
intended that bidders should prepare their bids on the assumption
that the required materials will in fact be available when they are
needed to accomplish performance of the contract. The impractica-
bility of bidding a firm price based upon the degree of diligence
which one of the interested parties will exercise in attempting to
obtain or produce the required materials is evident.
However, the obligation upon the government to diligently at-
tempt to supply material, although wholly intangible as a basis for
entering into a contract, is not something that can be easily dis-
pensed with, even by including in the contract exculpatory language
reciting that the government shall not be liable for delay for failure
to supply the materials. Provisions of this character have not been
enforced because the act of contracting for immunity from the
harmful consequence of a negligent act is said to raise a serious
question of public policy. In addition, the Court of Claims has ob-
served that such clauses would encourage bidders to include con-
tingencies in their bids to cover the additional cost which might
be incurred if government officials, relying upon the immunity
given them, were to. act negligently in attempting to provide the
materials. These principles were announced by the Court of Claims
in Ozark Dam Constructors v. United States,51 where the govern-
ment had contracted to supply thousands of barrels of cement
needed for the construction of a dam. The contract recited, how-
ever, that the government would not be liable for any expense
caused the contractor by delayed deliveries of cement, and pro-
vided only for the granting of an extension of time. For almost a
year prior to the time that it occurred, employees of the railroad
over which deliveries of the cement were to be made to the dam
had threatened to strike, and when the strike took place the needed
cement could not be delivered to the dam site. In the interim, the
668, 674-75 (1957), the Court of Claims held that failure on the part of the
government, when it required plaintiff to start work, to take into account the difficul-
ties which the government's supplier of steel penstocks was having in producing
the same, constituted a breach of the implied obligation not to delay plaintiff.
51. 180 Ct. CL 854, 127 F. Supp. 187 (1955).
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government had made no arrangements to deliver the cement by
alternative means if the strike occurred. Holding that the contract
provision exonerating the government from liability for delayed de-
livery of cement would not protect it under the circumstances, the
court said:
A contract for immunity from the harmful consequences of one's own
negligence always presents a serious question of public policy. That
question seems to us to be particularly serious when, as in this case, if the
Government got such an immunity, it bought it by requiring bidders on a
public contract to increase their bids to cover the contingency of dam-
ages caused to them by the negligence of the Government's agents. Why
the Government would want to buy and pay for such an immunity is hard
to imagine. If it does, by such a provision in the contract, get the coveted
privilege, it will win an occasional battle, but lose the war.
We do not say that a provision for non-liability such as was inserted
in the instant contract may not be effective with regard to some kinds or
degrees of negligence. We do say that the Government's position that the
provision must be taken literally, so that the Government is not liable
for the consequences of any conduct whatever of its representatives,
is wrong.
We look then at the facts of the instant case. Progress on an enormous
project, requiring tens of thousands of barrels of cement, is in jeopardy
because of a threatened strike on the railroad which is to carry the ce-
ment. At least from the time in July when the strike had been called and
was only averted at the last minute by the President's appointment of an
Emergency Board, it was apparent that there was a strong possibility of a
strike when the statutory waiting period would expire in September. Yet
no steps were taken to avoid, by having the cement delivered by other
means, the delay and damage to the plaintiffs which would certainly re-
sult if the job were closed down by the threatened strike. The possible
consequences were so serious, and the action necessary to prevent those
consequences was so slight, that the neglect was almost willful. It showed
a complete lack of consideration for the interests of the plaintiffs. If the
plaintiffs really included in their bid an amount to cover the contingency
of such inconsiderate conduct on the part of the Government's representa-
tives, the Government was buying and the public was paying for things
that were worth less than nothing.
Our conclusion is that the non-liability provision in the contract, when
fairly interpreted in the light of public policy, and of the rational inten-
tion of the parties, did not provide for immunity from liability in circum-
stances such as are recited in the plaintiffs' petition.52
Therefore, at least the requirement of diligence by the government,
ironically growing out of the Foley case, apparently cannot be
avoided, even by an express provision in the contract.
C. Government Delay in Providing a Site Upon Which To Work
Where the government engages a contractor to erect an improve-
ment upon a predetermined site within a specified time, gives the
52. Id. at 359-60, 127 F. Supp. at 190-91.
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contractor notice to proceed with the work, and then either fails to
make the site available to him or does so only belatedly, one would
suppose that the government had breached its contract and could
be required to respond in damages. However, one opposing the
granting of relief could argue, on the basis of certain decisions of
the Supreme Court, that the standard provisions of the government
contract relating to the right to make changes and the right to as-
sess liquidated damages preclude the government from liability for
such delay. The development of the law on this subject can be
traced by a brief consideration of three landmark cases decided by
the Supreme Court.
In 1926 the Supreme Court decided H. E. Crook Co. v. United
States, 3 where the plaintiff agreed to install heating systems in a
building to be constructed by another contractor. The contract, in
addition to containing the usual clauses relating to the right to
make changes, also embodied provisions which gave the govern-
ment the right to interrupt the work, with the further stipulation
that delays caused by the government would be considered un-
avoidable. Although the contract also contained a provision set-
ting forth tentative dates for the completion of the buildings upon
which the plaintiff was to work, at the time the contract was entered
into, the buildings were nearly one year behind in their progress.
The contract price was stated to include all expenses of every na-
ture connected with the work to be done. In light of the stringent
provisions of this agreement, the Supreme Court held that the tone
of the instrument precluded the belief that the government was
willing to subject itself to damages for delay, and that it could not
reasonably be expected that the government would bind itself to
a fixed deadline for the work to reach completion. The decision
was a hard one for government contractors, but was clearly justi-
fied from the contract language in that case, which was much less
favorable to the contractors than that found in present-day govern-
ment contracts.
The Crook decision, however, did not abrogate the right of a
contractor to recover damages for delay by the government in mak-
ing available a site upon which to work. Two years later, the Court
of Claims decided M. H. McCloskey, Jr. v. United States, where the
plaintiff was permitted to recover, the court saying in regard to the
Crook case:
The case was affirmed, but it was on the ground of peculiar provi-
sions in the contract. This court and the Supreme Court have repeatedly
held that a contractor may recover the damages he has incurred by rea-
son of delay wrongfully caused by the Government5 4
58. 270 U.S. 4 (1926).
54. 66 Ct. CL 105, 128-29 (1928).
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Other cases followed upholding this view. In 1939 and 1940, the
Court of Claims permitted recovery in the cases of MacDonald Eng'r
Co. v. United States,55 and Schmoll v. United States,56 at which
time it positively reaffirmed the views it had expressed in the Mc-
Closkey case.
However, in 1942 the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Rice,57 in which the government, after instructing the respondent to
proceed with the installation of equipment in a building, was exon-
erated from any liability when it became necessary to relocate the
site of the building. The decision of the Court was based upon its
earlier decision in the Crook case and its implied assumption that
the provisions of the standard form contract in the Rice case dif-
fered in no material respects from the illiberal provisions of the
contract in the Crook case.5
Four years later, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Howard P. Foley Co.,59 which, as previously related, involved a
contract to install lighting on the runways of an airport. The gov-
ernment, after giving the contractor notice to proceed, was unable
to permit him to proceed, because of subsurface difficulties encoun-
tered by another party contracting with the government. The Su-
55. 88 Ct. CL 473, 484-85 (1939).
56. 91 Ct. CL 1, 27 (1940).
57. 317 U.S. 61 (1942). For previous discussion of this case, see text accompany-
ing notes 81--87 supra.
58. Id. at 64-65. The Supreme Court said:
The Government contends, as it did in the Crook case, supra, that the change
in specifications resulting in delay was not a breach of the contract, but in ac-
cordance with its terms; that the extent of its obligation for permitted changes
was fixed by the contract; and that for delay the Government was required to
do no more than grant an extension of time ...
We agree with this view. We do not think the terms of the contract bound
the Government to have the contemplated structure ready for respondent at a
fixed time. Provisions of the contract showed that the dates were tentative and
subject to modification by the Government. The contractor was absolved from
payment of prescribed liquidated damages for delay, if it resulted from a num-
ber of causes, including "acts of Government and" unusually severe weather."
The Government reserved the right to make changes which might interrupt the
work, and even to suspend any portion of the construction if it were deemed
necessary. Respondent was required to adjust its work to that of the general
contractor, so that delay by the general contractor would necessarily delay
respondent's work. Under these circumstances it seems appropriate to repeat
what was said in the Crook case, that "When such a situation was displayed by
the contract it was not to be expected that the Government should bind itself to
a fixed time for the work to come to an end, and there is not a word in the in-
strument by which it did so, ,unless an undertaking contrary to what seems to
us the implication is implied." Crook Co. v. United States, supra, 6. Decisions
of this Court prior to the Crook case also make it clear that contracts such as
this do not bind the Government to have the property ready for work by a
contractor at a particular time. Wells Bros. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 83, 86;
Chouteau v. United States, supra; cf. United States v. Smith, 94 U.S. 214, 217.
59. 329 U.S. 64 (1946). For previous discussion of this case, see text accom-
panying notes 34-47 supra.
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preme Court refused to find a warranty and exonerated the govern-
ment from liability on the same basis as advanced in the Crook and
Rice cases. Again, as in the Rice case, the Court apparently did not
consider it significant that the contract provisions were not extra-
ordinarily stringent, contrary to those in the Crook case.60 Three
Justices dissented upon the ground that the government could not
avoid liability on this basis after it instructed the contractor to pro-
ceed with the work."'
It seems inequitable that after ordering a contractor to proceed
with work, the government should not be required to pay com-
pensation for its inability to make available to the contractor a
site upon which he could perform the agreed work, simply because
the standard form of contract contained general provisions relating
to time extensions, liquidated damages, and the right to make
changes. The Court of Claims, since the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Foley case, has indicated that it believes that the gov-
eminent must not be negligent "in making the work . . . available
to a contractor," this expression being found in that court's decision
in Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. United States, where it said:
60. Id. at 67-69. The language of the Court was as follows:
We can find no such warranty if we are to be consistent with our Crook and
Rice decisions, supra. The pertinent provisions in the instant contract are, in
every respect here material, substantially the same as those which were held in
the former cases to impose no obligation on the Government to pay damages
for delay. Here, as in the former cases, there are several contract provisions
which showed that the parties not only anticipated that the Government might
not finish its work as originally planned, but also provided in advance to pro-
tect the contractor from the consequences of such governmental delay, should
it occur. The contract reserved a governmental right to make changes in the
work which might cause interruption and delay, required respondent to coordi-
nate his work with the other work being done on the site, and clearly con-
templated that he would take up his work on the runway sections as they were
intermittently completed and paved. Article 9 of the contract, entitled "De-
lays--Dmages, set out a procedure to govern both parties in case of re-
spondent's delay in completion, whether such delay was caused by respondent,
the Government, or other causes. If delay were caused by respondent, the
Government would terminate the contract, take over the work, and hold re-
spondnt and its sureties liable. Or, in the alternative, the Government could
collect liquidated damages. If, on the other hand, delay were due to "acts of
the Government' or other specified events, includin g "unforeseeable causes,"
procedure was outlined for extending the time in which respondent was re-
quired to complete its contract, and relieving him from the penalties of con-
tract termination or liquidated damages.
In the Crook and Rice cases we held that the Government could not be
held liable for delay in making its work available to contractors unless the
terms of the contract imposed such liability. Those contracts, practically iden-
tical with the one here, were held to impose none ... The question on which
all these cases turn is: Did the Government obligate itself to pay damages to
a contractor solely because of delay in making the work available? We hold
again that it did not for the reasons elaborated in the Crook and Rice decisions.
61. Id. at 69. The dissenters were Justices Reed, Frankfurter, and Jackson.
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Generally the Government is not liable for delays in making the work
or material available to a contractor, United States v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61;
United States v. Foley Co., 329 U.S. 64. However, where the Govern-
ment or its authorized representatives are guilty of some act of negli-
gence or willful misconduct which delays the contractor's performance,
the Government is liable for the resulting damages. . . . This is so be-
cause there is in every Government contract, as in all contracts, an im-
plied obligation on the part of the Government not to willfully or negli-
gently interfere with the contractor in the performance of his contract.
When the contract does not specify particular dates upon which
delivery of the material is to be made, the implied obligation just referred
to is an obligation not to willfully or negligently fail to furnish the ma-
terials in time to be installed in the ordinary and economical course of
the performance of the contract. . . . If the Government exerts every
effort to supply the contractor with the necessary materials on time, it
cannot be held that it has willfully or negligently interfered with per-
formance, Otis Williams & Co. v. United States, 120 C. Cls. 249; W. E.
Barling v. United States, 126 C. Cls. 34.62
Although the Kiewit case involved a delay in delivery of mate-
rials, it seems probable that the doctrine there followed will be
applied in cases of site delays too.
III. RECOVERY OF DAMAGES
A. Claims for Damages for Delay Need Not Be Administratively
Presented for Consideration
Since claims for unliquidated damages based on breach of con-
tract are beyond the jurisdiction of administrative officers to pay,
there is no requirement that they be administratively presented
for consideration in advance of suit.6 3 If they are presented, an ad-
ministrative decision or finding of fact made with respect to them
is not final under the disputes clause of government contracts, which
empowers the head of the department to determine with finality
disputed questions of fact arising under the contract. 4 Similarly,
a decision made by the contracting officer, or on appeal, by the
head of the department, concerning the amount of additional time
62. 138 Ct. Cl. 668, 674-75, 151 F. Supp. 726, 731 (1957).
63. Railroad Waterproofing Corp. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 911, 915-16, 137
F. Supp. 713, 715-16 (1956); Thomas Earle & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 100 Ct. CL
494, 503-06 (1944); Plato v. United States, 86 Ct. Cl. 665, 677-78 (1938);
Phoenix Bridge Co. v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 603, 629-30 (1937); see Allied
Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 129 Ct. Cl. 400, 406-07, 124 F. Supp. 366, 369-70
(1954); Langevin v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 15, 31 (1943).
64. Railroad Waterproofing Corp. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 911, 915-16, 137
F. Supp. 713, 715-16 (1956); Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank v. United States, 121
Ct. Cl. 203, 245-46, 101 F. Supp. 755, 758-59, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 963 (1952);
Pottsville Cast & Mach. Shops, Inc. v. United States, 121 Ct. Cl. 129, 156, 101 F.
Supp. 370, 373 (1951); Anthony P. Miller, Inc. v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 252,
830, 77 F. Supp. 209, 212 (1948); see Allied Contractors, Inc. v. United States,
129 Ct. Cl. 400, 406-07, 124 F. Supp. 366, 370 (1954).
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that should be granted to a contractor for purposes of remitting
liquidated damages because of some delay caused by the govern-
ment, would not be final under the disputes clause as a determina-
tion of the period for which the government might have to respond
in damages to the contractor for that delay. This is so because the
contract does not empower the government to fix the extent of its
own unreasonable delays for the purpose of determining unliquidated
damages in favor of the contractor. 5
B. Types of Damages Recoverable for Delays
In the discussion that follows relating to the liability of the gov-
ernment to pay damages to a contractor for losses experienced as
a result of the government's delays, it must be clearly understood
that the delays referred to are those resulting from acts or failure
to act on the part of the government in its contracting capacity
rather than in its sovereign capacity. The government occupies the
unique position of being both a contracting party and a sovereign.
As a contracting party, the government theoretically enjoys no
special benefit under the law, and its contract commitments are
judged by the same principles as those which ordinarily apply be-
tween contracting parties in private industry.66 In its sovereign ca-
pacity, however, it is not accountable for its acts and is not liable
in damages for delay.I Delays of this latter sort which have been
most frequently experienced have been those arising from the diffi-
culty in obtaining materials due to allocation and priority systems
put into effect by the government during periods of national emer-
gency.6 8
65. Pope v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 436, 447-49 (1932), cert. denied, 288
U.S. 610 (1933).
66. Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947); United
States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106, 111 (1944); Reading Steel Casting Co.
v. United States, 268 U.S. 186, 188 (1925); New York Mail & Newspaper Transp.
Co. v. United States, 139 Ct. CL 751, 759, 154 F. Supp. 271, 276, cert. denied,
355 U.S. 904 (1957); International Arms & Fuse Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl.
231, 238 (1931); Nashville Industrial Corp. v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl. 443, 458
(1930); Snyder Corp. v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 667, 676 (1930).
67. E.g., Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925); Barnes v. United
States, 123 Ct. CL 101, 124-25, 105 F. Supp. 817, 820 (1952); Ottinger v. United
States, 116 Ct. CL. 282, 284, 88 F. Supp. 881, 882 (1950) (dictum); Clemmer
Constr. Co. v. United States, 108 Ct. Cl. 718, 721-22, 71 F. Supp. 917, 919 (1947).
In the Ottinger case, however, the government was nevertheless held liable, the
court saying:
We think that when agents of the Government, without justification in
statute, executive order, administrative discretion or otherwise, engage in con-
duct which is a violation of an express or implied provision of a Government
contract the mantle of sovereignty does not give the Government immunity
from suit.
Ottinger v. United States, supra at 285.
68. Myers v. United States, 120 Ct. CL. 126, 136 (1951); Ross Elec. Constr. Co.
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Damages sustained by a contractor as a result of delay on the
part of the government will not be denied in the Court of Claims
on the ground that they are not susceptible of indisputable accuracy.
The test instead requires that the damages be calculated upon a rea-
sonable basis and, under all of the circumstances, reasonably re-
flect the approximate injury.6 In arriving at its determination, the
Court of Claims will even draw inferences from the evidence as a
whole to reach a conclusion in the nature of a jury verdict."0 And
the court has not been unwilling to apportion damages, where it is
possible to do so in a manner which permits the recovery of monies
due to losses resulting from delays caused by the government, and
at the same time exclude those attributable to delays resulting from
causes for which the government was not responsible.7'
While it is not uncommon for contractors, when seeking relief
before the Court of Claims, to include the claims of their subcon-
tractors arising out of the same delays for which the government
was responsible, the claim of the subcontractor may be defeated
if the subcontract contains exculpatory language which would pro-
tect the general contractor from responsibility to the subcontractor
because of the government's delays. 2 If no exculpatory clause exists,
the privity between the general contractor and the United States
has been regarded as sufficient to provide standing for a subcon-
tractor in the Court of Claims.7"
v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 644, 662-63, 77 F. Supp. 749, 749-50 (1948); Clem-
mer Constr. Co. v. United States, 108 Ct. CL. 718, 720-22, 71 F. Supp. 917, 918-19
(1947); J. F. Barbour & Sons v. United States, 104 Ct. CL. 360, 363-64, 63 F. Supp.
349, 350-54 (1944); Gothwaite v. United States, 102 Ct. CL. 400, 401 (1944).
69. Hirsch v. United States, 94 Ct. CL. 602, 631 (1941); Goltra v. United
States, 91 Ct. Cl. 42, 74 (1940), modified, 312 U.S. 203 (1941); Bradley v. United
States, 66 Ct. Cl. 551, 556 (1928); Electric Boat Co. v. United States, 66 Ct.
Cl. 333, 375-76 (1928).
70. Western Contracting Corp. v. United States, 141 Ct. CL. No. 344-55 (Dec.
3, 1958).
71. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. United States, 138 Ct. CL. 668, 678-79, 151 F.
Supp. 726, 733 (1957); Chalender v. United States, 127 Ct. CL. 557, 565-66, 119
F. Supp. 186, 191-92 (1954).
72. F. H. McGraw & Co. v. United States, 131 Ct. CL 501, 509, 130 F. Supp.
394, 399 (1955); Continental Ill. Nael Bank v. United States, 121 Ct. Cl. 203, 244-
45, 101 F. Supp. 755, 758, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 963 (1952); Continental IlL
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 112 Ct. CL. 563, 564-65, 81 F. Supp. 596, 597 (1949);
Severin v. United States, 99 Ct. CL. 435, 442-44 (1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S.
733 (1944).
73. Donovan Constr. Co. v. United States, 188 Ct. CL. 97, 98-100, 149 F. Supp.
898, 900, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 826 (1957); Warren Bros. Roads Co. v. United
States, 123 Ct. Cl. 48, 83-84, 105 F. Supp. 826, 831 (1952); Anthony P. Miller,
Inc. v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 252, 334, 77 F. Supp. 209, 214 (1948); C. B.
Ross Co. v. United States, 109 Ct. CL. 690, 719, 74 F. Supp. 420, 424 (1947),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948); cf. United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 737-38
(1944).
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C. Types of Costs Recoverable for Delays
The costs allowable for proven delay are many and varied, and
only the more common types allowed will be mentioned. One com-
mon type, found in almost all cases involving delay, is the added
expense of home or general office overhead.7 4 Such expense is al-
locable to a particular contract in the ratio that the value of that
contract bears to the total value of all contracts performed in the
same period.75 Increased field office overhead is also frequently
recovered,7 6 as is the cost of job supervision, including the salaries
of the superintendent and other straight-time employees.77 The cost
of maintaining an organization on the job, such as holding men
idle in daily expectation that the required materials will arrive,
is a proper element of damages,78 and reasonable equipment owner-
ship expense for idle time (presently based upon fifty percent of
rental value) is also allowed.79 The cost of storing, protecting, and
maintaining tools and equipment during the delays is recoverable. 0
74. Reiss & Weinsier, Inc. v. United States, 126 Ct. CL 713, 721, 116 F. Supp.
562, 567 (1958); Herbert M. Baruch Corp. v. United States, 98 Ct. CL 107, 126
(1941); Largura Constr. Co. v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 531, 547 (1939).
75. F. H. McGraw & Co. v. United States, 131 Ct. CL 501, 512, 130 F. Supp.
394, 400-01 (1955); Henry Ericsson Co. v. United States, 104 Ct. CL. 397, 427,
62 F. Supp. 312, 326 (1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 784 (1946); Brand Inv. Co.
v. United States, 102 Ct. CL 40, 44, 58 F. Supp. 749, 751 (1944), cert. denied,
324 U. S. 850 (1945); Herbert M. Baruch Corp. v. United States, 93 Ct. CL. 107,
126 (1941).
76. F. H. McGraw & Co. v. United States, 131 Ct. CL 501, 512, 130 F. Supp.
394, 400-01 (1955); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 566,
577 (1932).
77. Hirsch v. United States, 94 Ct. CL 602, 635 (1941); Herbert M. Baruch
Corp. v. United States, 93 Ct. CL 107, 119 (1941); Herbert M. Baruch Corp. v.
United States, 92 Ct. CL. 571, 579 (1941); G. Schwartz & Co. v. United States,
89 Ct. CL 82, 88 (1939); MacDonald Eng'r Co. v. United States, 88 Ct. CL 473,
480 (1939); Sobel v. United States, 88 Ct. CL. 149, 166 (1938); Plato v. United
States, 86 Ct. CL. 665, 675 (1938); Carroll v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 108, 129(1932); Pope v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 64, 100 (1932), cert. denied, 303 U.S.
654 (1938); Pope v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 436, 444-45 (1932), cert. denied,
288 U.S. 610 (1933); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. CL. 566,
577 (1932).
78. Reiss & Weinsier, Inc. v. United States, 126 Ct. CL. 713, 718-19, 116 F.
Supp. 562, 566 (1953); Largura Constr. Co. v. United States, 88 Ct. CL 531, 547
(1939); Donnell-Zane Co. v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 368, 372 (1932); Levering
& Garrigues Co. v. United States, 71 Ct. Cl. 739, 757-58 (1931).
79. Warren Bros. Roads Co. v. United States, 123 Ct. CL. 48, 82-83, 105 F.
Supp. 826, 830-31 (1952); Henry Ericsson Co. v. United States, 104 Ct. CL. 397,
427, 62 F. Supp. 312, 326 (1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 784 (1946); Brand Inv.
Co. v. United States, 102 Ct. CL 40, 44-45, 58 F. Supp. 749, 751 (1944), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1945).
80. Herbert M. Baruch Corp. v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. 571, 579 (1941);
Joplin v. United States, 89 Ct. CL 345, 361-62 (1939); Edward E. Gillen Co. v.
United States, 88 Ct. CL 347, 356 (1939); American Bridge Co. v. United
States, 72 Ct. CL 344, 363-64 (1931).
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Advances in the price of materials, as well as wage increases, are
also compensable,8' as are all forms of insurance and additional
bond premiums.8 2
If the delay has resulted in inefficiency and increased cost through
inability to follow a definite plan of the work, that increased cost
is recoverable.83 Likewise, the increased cost of performing work
during adverse weather conditions that normally would not have
been experienced, including even temporary heat, has been held
to be recoverable.84
IV. SUSPENSION OF WORK CLAUSE
Contractors performing construction work for the Army, Air
Force, Coast Guard, or the Atomic Energy Commission, when de-
layed by an act of the government, have a great advantage over
contractors engaged in similar work for the Navy, the Veterans
Administration, and numerous other government agencies, because
the first group has taken affirmative action to assure contractors of
compensation for delays caused by the government.
The relief extended has taken the form of a suspension of work
clause, in which the contracting officer is given the right to suspend
all or any part of the work for the convenience of the government.
The clause recites that if the suspension lasts an unreasonable length
of time, causes the contractor additional expense, and is not
necessitated by any fault or negligence of the contractor, the stipu-
lated contract price shall be increased to compensate for such
delay.85
81. Langevin v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 15, 37 (1943); Stapleton Constr. Co.
v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. 551, 557-59 (1940); Rust Eng'r Co. v. United States,
86 Ct. Cl. 461, 468 (1938); Carroll v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 103, 129 (1932);
Donnell-Zane Co. v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 368, 372 (1932); Levering & Gar-
rigues Co. v. United States, 71 Ct. Cl. 739, 757-58 (1931); Steel Prods. Eng'r Co.
v. United States, 71 Ct. Cl. 457, 471 (1931).
82. Stapleton Constr. Co. v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. 551, 560 (1940); G.
Schwartz & Co. v. United States, 89 Ct. CL. 82, 88 (1939); American Bridge Co. v.
United States, 72 Ct. CI. 344, 363 (1931); see Herbert M. Baruch Corp. v. United
States, 93 Ct. Cl. 107, 119 (1941).
83. Langevin v. United States, 100 Ct. CL. 15, 37 (1943); Edward E. Gillen
Co. v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 347, 356 (1939); Donnell-Zane Co. v. United
States, 75 Ct. Cl. 368, 372 (1932).
84. Kirk v. United States, Ill Ct. Cl. 552, 565-67, 77 F. Supp. 614, 615-16
(1948); Hirsch v. United States, 94 Ct. CL. 602, 635-36 (1941); Stapleton Constr.
Co. v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. 551, 559-60 (1940); Ross Eng'r Co. v. United
States, 92 Ct. Cl. 253, 255-56 (1940); G. Schwartz & Co. v. United States, 89
Ct. CL. 82, 88 (1939); Edward E. Gillen Co. v. United States, 88 Ct. CL. 347, 357
(1939); Largura Constr. Co. v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 531, 547 (1939); Plato
v. United States, 86 Ct. Cl. 665, 676-77 (1938); Karno-Smith Co. v. United States,
84 Ct. Cl. 110, 124 (1936).
85. The suspension of work clause as included in specifications of the United
States Army Corps of Engineers provides:
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While the language used could be construed to mean that the
relief would not be forthcoming in the absence of some affirmative
order of suspension, the clause has not been so construed by the
administrative boards that have been called upon to consider its
application. Instead, the position has been asserted that where an
act of the government caused delay, an obligation was imposed up-
on the contracting officer to issue the order of suspension, and if
he failed to do so, the Board would regard "that as done which
should have been done." For instance, in Guerin Bros. the Army
Board of Contract Appeals86 said:
We hold that where an action by the Government through its authorized
representatives in the performance of the contract "unreasonably delays
the progress of the work and causes additional expense or loss to the Con-
tractor" it becomes the duty of the contracting officer, under contracts
identical with that now under consideration, to provide for such delays
by a suspension order as contemplated by paragraph GC-12, supra, and
we shall in this case treat that as done which should have been done if
and when the facts so warrant.
87
The clause is recognized as creating an exception to the limitations
imposed by the Crook, Rice, and Foley decisions of the Supreme
Court.s8
Although it has been repeatedly held that claims for damages
GC-11. The Contracting Officer may order the contractor to suspend all or
any part of the work for such period of time as may be determined by him
to be necessary or desirable for the convenience of the Government. Unless
such suspension unreasonably delays the progress of the work and causes addi-
tional expense or loss to the contractor, no increase in contract price will be
allowed. In the case of suspension of all or any part of the work for an un-
reasonable length of time causing additional expense, not due to the fault or
negligence of the contractor, the Contracting Officer shall make an equitable
adjustment in the contract price and modify the contract accordingly. An
equitable extension of time for the completion of the work in the event of any
such suspension will be allowed the contractor; provided, however, that the
suspension was not due to the fault or negligence of the contractor.
86. Note that the Army Board of Contract Appeals is the forerunner of the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals.
87. Army B.C.A. No. 1551 (1948).
88. In Basich Bros. Constr. Co., Army B.C.A. No. 1592 (1949), which involved
a delay by the government in supplying cement, the Board allowed the recovery
of delay costs under a suspension of work clause, saying:
The Government cites and quotes from the cases of H. E. Crook Company,
Inc. v. United States, 270 U.S. 4; United States v. Howard P. Foley Company,
Inc., 329 U.S. 64, 4 CCF 60, 193; 1. J. Kelly Company v. United States, 4
CCF 60, 215; Realty and Finance Corporation of Virginia, 7 Comp. Gen. 645
(1928), and United States v. Rice Construction Company, 317 U.S. 61, 1 CCF
396. These cases construe the "Delays-Damages" article common to all of them
adversely to the claimant. These authorities would no doubt be controlling in
the case involved here, which contains the same "Delays-Damages" article
but for the Article GC-12 (suspension of work clause) which is contained in
the appellant's contract and was not contained in the cases cited by and relied
on by the Government. ...
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based on delay are beyond the jurisdiction of the contracting officer
to pay, and need not even be submitted to him for consideration,89
the legality of including in a contract a suspension clause which
requires the contracting officer to make compensation for delay has
been upheld."
The suspension clause applies to construction contracts only of
the departments or agencies referred to above, and to the procure-
ment contracts of none. The fact that it is found in the construction
contracts of the Army, as administered by the Corps of Engineers,
and not in the construction contracts of the Navy, as administered
by the Bureau of Yards and Docks, is one of the oddities so often
faced by a contractor doing business with the government; it is
rendered even more paradoxical by the statement of a former
Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, that the financial risk
which a contractor undergoes through interruption or suspension
of his work by the government should be eliminated.91
In 1956 the President directed that a comprehensive review be
made of government procurement policies and procedures. There
was accordingly created within the General Services Administration
a Task Force for Review of Government Procurement Policies and
Procedures, and a study group was appointed to consider and draft
a uniform suspension of work clause. The American Bar Association
and the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, having passed
resolutions calling for the adoption of a uniform suspension clause,
sent representatives to appear before the study group. After hear-
ings, which extended over three months, the study group, on April
30, 1958, was able to agree upon the language of such a clause.92
89. See notes 59-61 supra.
90. 36 Dtcs. Com,. GarN. 302-03 (1956), holding:
There is no legal objection to the inclusion in Government contracts of a
provision permitting changes and suspensions by the Government and providing
for additional payment therefor. . . Further, we have held that a contract
may be modified to provide for additional compensation to the contractor as
reimbursement for increased costs resulting from delays caused by the Govern-
ment.
91. Rear Admiral J. R. Perry, Chief, Bureau of Yards and Docks, in an address
to the Associated General Contractors of America at New Orleans, March 1955:
[Tjhere is at present no clause or provision in our contracts for price adjust-
ment in the event of unforeseen Government interruption or suspension. This
lack of an avenue of relief for the contractor in the event of such possible oc-
currences imposes upon him a risk which I believe we in Government are
obliged to eliminate.
92. This agreement was no inconsiderable accomplishment in view of the
divergent views of the various departments, as explained in the memorandum
accompanying the recommendation, which was prepared by Paul H. Gantt, chair-
man of the study group:
This is a historical report. For the first time since 1921 a group of Government
procurement and construction experts recommends a uniform, mandatory "Sus-
pension of the Work" clause. This also represents a spectacular reversal in
policy attitude. It may be recalled that Government-wide efforts to draft a uni-
form clause completely floundered in 1950.
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The clause as drafted by the study group is presently being circu-
lated among the departments and agencies which are engaged in
construction work and, if and when it is approved, will be em-
bodied in a General Services Administration regulation.
As presently drafted, the suspension clause will be mandatory
in all construction contracts in excess of $10,000. By its terms, it
will cover any act of delay on the part of the government, including
direct acts of suspension as well as delays resulting from changes
and changed conditions. If no time is prescribed in the contract for
the performance of an act by the government, the obligation of the
government concerning time of performance will be gauged in
the light of what would have been reasonable under the circum-
stances. Under the proposed clause, no claim would be allowed for
any costs incurred thirty days before written notice to the govern-
ment of the action or failure to act which was causing delay, unless
a claim in an amount stated was asserted as soon as practicable
after the delay.93
It is particularly important that the proposed clause expressly
states that any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under
the same shall be subject to the disputes clause. Thus, the contract-
ing officer is given the right to determine the amount of the adjust-
ment, subject to appeal to the head of the department. The action
of the head of the department is, in turn, subject to review by the
93. Price Adjustment for Suspension, Delay, or Interruption of the Work.
The contracting officer may order the contractor in writing to suspend all or
any part of the work for such period of time as he may determine to be appro-
priate for the convenience of the Government. If the performance of all or any
part of the work is suspended, delayed, or interrupted for an unreasonable
period of time, without the fault or negligence of the contractor, by an act of
the contracting officer in the administration of the contract (including, but
not limited to, an order to suspend, or an interruption, delay or suspension inci-
dent to changes or changed conditions) or by any failure of the Government in
the administration of the contract to do any act required by this contract
within the time specified in the contract or, if no time is specified, within a
reasonable time, an adjustment shall be made by the contracting officer for any
increase in the cost of performance of the contract (excluding profit) neces-
sarily caused by such suspension, delay, or interruption, and the contract shall
be modified in writing accordingly. No adjustment shall be made to the extent
that performance by the contractor would have been prevented by other causes
even if the Government's obligations under the contract had been met in a
timely manner. No claim under this clause shall be allowed (i) for any costs
incurred more than thirty days before the contractor notifies the contracting
officer in writing of the action or failure to act involved, and (ii) unless the
claim, in an amount stated, is asserted in writing as soon as practicable after
the termination of such suspension, delay, or interruption but not later than
the date of final settlement of the contract. Any dispute concerning a question
of fact arising under this clause shall be subject to the Disputes clause.
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Court of Claims under the same conditions as previously related. 4
Unless the notice, claim, decision of the contracting officer, appeal
to the head of the department and decision by the head of the
department in a disputed case all occur in the manner provided for
in the contract, the contractor will have failed to exhaust his ad-
ministrative remedy, and the Court of Claims would be powerless to
extend relief.
The fate of the proposed uniform suspension clause, presently un-
dergoing consideration, is of course unknown; but it is this writer's
opinion that this clause, or one closely following it, will probably
be adopted in the near future. It should serve to eliminate many
of the legal difficulties which prevail today where governmental de-
lay is necessarily predicated upon breach of contract. In addition to
providing a contractor with an expeditious remedy, it should also
result in long-range savings to the government through the submis-
sion of lower bids which will no longer have to take into account
the hazards attendant upon governmental delays in the performance
of contracts.
94. See note 14 supra.
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